Leo W. Gerard

Richard McCormack

Q&A

Leo W. Gerard: Richard, when you appeared recently at Youngstown State University as a guest of the Center for Working-Class Lecture Series, you talked about how essential manufacturing is to the U.S. economy and how politicians seem clueless about that. In fact, you said, “Politicians don’t get it.” When did that happen because clearly politicians in the 1950s understood that a solid economy rests on manufacturing products of real value?

Richard McCormack:  It happened imperceptibly over the past three decades, but perhaps the defining (though little observed) event was when Wal-Mart overtook General Motors as the country’s largest employer. When that happened, the retail industry became one of the most powerful political entities in the country, replacing the manufacturing industry.

The crossover from GM to Wal-Mart is important because retail started setting the terms of the debate not only with politicians, but also with manufacturers. Retailers are driven by increasing profits by pennies on the dollar by paying workers low wages with no benefits and buying cheap imports.

The loss of the manufacturing sector’s political influence also occurred with the rise of the finance sector, which became the dominant force in political gift-giving. The Wall Street financial sector does not give one-half hoot about American jobs.

The loss of America’s industrial capability also coincided with the persistent selling of economic ideology to the American public and its politicians that the country would be a lot more prosperous getting rid of crappy manufacturing jobs and creating jobs in the service and “knowledge” sectors. That grand experiment in creating a “post-industrial economy” just suffered a monumental collapse.

Americans have allowed the big corporate multinational companies and their agents to take control of their political system. It remains to this day a system that is stacked against American workers and American taxpayers. Americans have not entered the fight to save American jobs. I wonder if the middle class is drugged up on Britney Spears, Michael Jackson and Tiger Woods; addicted to sugar, salt and fat; fake “news” shows on television; and Prozac to deal with depression and lull them into thinking that their condition is beyond control. Something is stopping Americans from getting off their couches and demanding a voice in America’s economic future. Americans have lost their country to a few people who make a lot of money off outsourcing, off-shoring and importing everything Americans used to make and continue to buy. Americans must take their country back before it is too late.

Gerard: You have written about this problem in the book, “Manufacturing A Better Future for America,” and elsewhere. How do we make politicians understand how vital manufacturing is?

 McCormack: Politicians need to be hit over their heads with a baseball bat as forcefully as is possible, with Americans insisting that they at least acknowledge that a country that doesn’t make what is consumes is going to fail. It is a simple concept. There are many historical precedents of countries and empires failingafter having lost their productive capacity. It is an ancient concept: a country that does not have industry cannot support an army. 

The United States has just gone through a period of unprecedented loss of wealth. Its citizens have taken a collective economic step down. Yet politicians are sitting smug in the belief that they can borrow more money. They work in Washington, D.C., where I live. This place is humming. Most of them have no idea what the country looks like. Have they been to Detroit, Saginaw, Youngstown – America’s heartland? America’s heartland is dead. That means its heart has stopped beating. What happens to a person when their heart stops beating?

The financial meltdown wasn’t caused by the housing bubble or the financial bubble or the dot-com bubble, although all of those things contributed. It was caused by the simple fact that American consumers have sent all of their wealth to China, Korea, Japan, Germany and Mexico buying all of the things they once made. Tell that to the politicians. They don’t get it. They don’t get it and they don’t get it, which means they have to be hit over the head and be hit over the head and be hit over the head as hard as is possible to hit them with the simple message, over and again: the country cannot survive if it sends all of its wealth offshore. The country has to produce what it consumes. Our politicians do not understand this basic FACT. Have they looked at why China is becoming a superpower? It’s not because China exports its sports heroes and pop culture. It’s because China has embraced manufacturing as THE means to economic superiority. It is the same path the United States took to reach global dominance. Inexplicably, the United States abandoned that path.

Gerard: In Youngstown, you quoted Ralph E. Gomory, the retired IBM senior vice president for Science and Technology and a winner of the Heinz Award for Technology, the Economy and Employment, as saying the interests of American corporations have diverged from the interests of America, yet politicians act as if they’re still the same. Can you explain what that means both in terms of the economy and employment?

McCormack: Ralph Gomory has made one of the most profound and important observations on the current global economic situation. He says that outsourcing is not free trade. Yet the federal government still represents the interests of the powerful companies that are firing millions of American workers and shifting those jobs offshore. 

Domestic manufacturers have told me repeatedly that the greatest protectionists in our country are the corporate and financial companies that are doing everything in their power to protect their assets in China. To influence policy in their favor, the multinationals, retailers, importers and foreign producers fund think tanks, trade associations, lobbyists, lawyers and public relations firms. These are the real protectionists, not American businessmen who want to save American jobs and the American middle class.

The U.S. government continues to craft policies that are beneficial for companies that outsource jobs. For instance, the U.S. government refuses to confront China over its currency manipulation because the companies that benefit most from China’s undervalued currency are the American companies that have shifted their production there. Who does the U.S. government represent? The tens of millions of American workers who get the ax due to China’s blatant cheating, or the few CEOs at multinational companies and the financial class who make more and more money?

It was no coincidence that the stock market had its best year ever in 2009 – the same year millions of Americans were losing their jobs. The dynamic still hasn’t changed, despite the financial sector’s meltdown: Every time a company announces American worker layoffs, its stock price goes up. Yet policymakers equate the stock market with a healthy economy. They are as wrong on that as they are on the belief that the world is flat.

Gerard:  You have also said that politicians’ decision to implement the concept of free trade – which is not fair trade – has largely contributed to the nation’s problems. Would you talk about how something as positive-sounding as free trade devastated American industry?

McCormack:  A friend of mine works at the Commerce Department. He says that free trade is a farce. The United States has tariffs of 2 percent or 3 percent on incoming products. Yet the United States trades with countries with tariffs that are 10 times higher. Is that free trade? He has a simple solution to the U.S. trade crisis: hold up a mirror to any nation trading with the United States. Whatever their tariffs are on U.S. products entering their country, that is what the U.S. tariff should be on their products entering America. 

How can U.S. producers compete when they must pay for all of the costs that foreign producers don’t have to add to the price of their product? These costs include things like scrubbers and baghouses on coal plants. Not requiring the generation of clean power is a Chinese subsidy offered to all manufacturers setting up shop in China. It is an unfair subsidy that U.S. companies cannot counter without the U.S. government saying that it is unfair. Even worse, 75 percent of the mercury pollution in the United States can be attributed to Asian coal-fired plants that do not have emissions controls. The majority of these plants are located in China. China is poisoning America. If it was happening in the United States, the federal government would take the American utility or industrial company to court and impose fines of millions of dollars. What does the U.S. government do about China’s toxic emissions drifting over U.S. airspace? Nothing.

U.S. manufacturers have to abide by a thousand EPA rules and OSHA standards. Not so in China. That is a huge advantage. The United States government lets American companies that have set up shop in China get away with not having to abide by American standards – even though their products are being sold in the United States.

It is morally wrong.

Any foreign product sold in the United States should be required to be produced under the same conditions as is required for producers of the same product in the United States. If these requirements are not going to be enforced on overseas competitors, as they are here so vigorously by our federal government, then those cost advantages should be calculated and tacked onto the price of the product entering the United States.

Foreign producers should NOT have this unfair advantage. It is an outrage that the United States has allowed this to occur.

It is time for the country to stop listening to importers, their agents in Washington, including foreign governments, retailers and the financial industry. The U.S. government has to start representing the interest of American manufacturers, workers and business owners. It does not now. This is not a conspiracy theory. This is reality.

Gerard: In the chapter you wrote for the book, “Manufacturing A Better Future for America,” you said something that every American should find frightening. You said that when Congress cuts the taxes of individuals or gives them tax rebates in an attempt to stimulate the economy, the actual effect is to create jobs in foreign countries. Can you explain that?

McCormack: The U.S. government has just spent the past 10 years trying DESPERATELY to stimulate the U.S. economy, with trillion-dollar tax cuts, tax giveaways, low interest rates and even two wars that have lasted for nine years. Then the Democrats took office in 2009 and enacted their own $787 billion “stimulus.” Every time Americans have had a few extra bucks in their pocket (from tax cuts to direct government payments to home equity loans) they have spent that money on products that are now made somewhere else in the world. Is it any wonder why China’s economy was growing by 10 percent per year during the past 10 years, as U.S. consumers shipped more and more of their hard-earned dollars there to buy everything? 

Gerard: You have been critical of the second economic stimulus bill – called a jobs bill – that Congress is now talking about. You contend that the proposed bill won’t create new jobs. Here’s what you actually said, “I don’t see any jobs there. I just see more money being spent.” What’s wrong with that bill?

McCormack:  It is more of the same. Only a very small percentage of the bill encourages investment in U.S. production. There is not a single program aimed at countering the incentives that foreign countries are providing their companies and U.S. producers to set up operations in their country. The United States has to start competing – to start countering those incentives with its own incentives to manufacturing companies. It doesn’t matter if these companies are American companies or foreign companies. To create lasting, decent jobs, the United States needs global companies to open production in the United States to serve the U.S. market.

Small American companies do not need a $30-billion tax cut to hire workers. They need CUSTOMERS. They won’t hire a soul unless they have a customer to sell them a product. Yet the country continues to lose manufacturing plants to China.

Gerard: If you could actually get Congress to listen to you, what would you tell them is necessary to create good new jobs?

McCormick: Ask the 50 economic development officers from each of the states to form a U.S. Economic Development Council. These people and their offices know what is being planned in terms of company expansions. Give them a war chest, some of the TARP money or funding from the proposed “jobs” bill, and tell them to deploy the same tactics they use in their states to attract industry to America. All of the states are competing against each other to attract industrial investment. They should be working together, especially since supply chains cross state borders.

Gerard: When I go to Washington, what I hear is that we don’t need manufacturing. That’s old and dirty. So many politicians say the U.S. can move to a financial and service economy. You disagree with that. Why?

McCormick: I hear it too, though a little less often, thank goodness.  This argument is what has led to the demise of the United States. People are just starting to realize that as manufacturing goes offshore, high-end jobs in design and research and development go with it. When a plant closes, the supply chain disappears. This supply chain includes materials and parts producers, software providers, like CAD (computer-aided design), ERP (enterprise resource planning) and dozens of other high-tech equipment providers, machine tool companies, maintenance, accounting, packaging – the list goes on to include such things as the local restaurants, janitorial services and those dependent on the plant’s tax revenues, like librarians, county clerks, police officers and teachers. These are service jobs, all of which depend on manufacturing. One manufacturing job supports 15 other jobs. No other category of job has such a high multiplier. The United State must do whatever it can to start creating manufacturing jobs.

Gerard: We are losing at the international trade game with imports far exceeding exports and creating a massive trade deficit. Is it over for the U.S., or can Washington actually do something to reverse this situation?

McCormick: The game is not over. Not yet. But the country is perilously close to a period of sustained pain caused by continuing huge trade and budget deficits. The United States is assuming greater and greater debt. The country cannot borrow its way to prosperity. At some point very soon, the United States has to stop accumulating debt and start the process of paying it down. The only way to do this is by producing the products Americans consume – like cellphones, televisions, digital cameras, computers, semiconductors, printed circuit boards, autos, steel, household items, appliances, luggage, clothes – everything – and to start producing a new generation of radical and revolutionary products that the rest of the world needs to buy.

***

Richard McCormack is editor and publisher of Manufacturing & Technology News, a publication he created in 1994. It is read by industry executives, government officials and academics on five continents. McCormack has reported on science and technology, industry and government in Washington, D.C. for 26 years specializing in economic competitiveness and globalization. He has won numerous journalism awards for investigative, analytical and interpretative reporting. He is author of the book, “Lean Machines: Learning from the Leaders of the Next Industrial Revolution.” And he is the editor of the new book, “Manufacturing A Better Future for America,” for which he wrote the first chapter, “The Plight of American Manufacturing.”

Tom Croft and Leo Gerard

Leo W. Gerard: Tom, your new book, Up From Wall Street: The Responsible Investment Alternative, provides both cautionary tales for those responsible for investing workers’ pension funds and a field guide of practical assistance for institutional investors who want to use responsible investing (RI) techniques. Let’s start with the caution. Why should workers care how their pension funds are invested?

Thomas Croft:  As we discovered when we pulled together the original Heartland Labor/Capital Working Group in 1995, it’s incredible how much we don’t know when it comes to the investment practices and trends that affect workers’ retirement assets and other institutional savings.  Before the crash, workers owned over $9 trillion in pension trusts, and, if we added it all up, working families owned $24 trillion in all institutional savings.  So, steelworkers, teachers, insurance holders, students and college endowments, and the vast majority of our population have an interest in how these funds are invested.   

Since these funds control a majority of public stocks, we have an interest in how those corporations are governed.  In terms of the general economy, we have an interest in the general direction of investment flows.  The historian Kevin Phillips has written about the growing power of the financial services industry.  In the 1970s, manufacturing led financial services by a two-to-one margin.  By 2006, goods production had shrunk to just 12% of GDP while financial services jumped to a “swollen 20-21% of GDP.”   So, financial sector profits, as a percent of domestic corporate profits, rose from 16% in 1973 to 41% in 2000s.   That means that vast waves of our savings and assets—our money—has increasingly disappeared into a dark hole called financialization.  I’ll come back to financialization.

So, what it means in terms of the economy is that the country doesn’t build things anymore.  Remember Allentown, and the song by Billy Joel that described the shutdown of Beth Steel?  Bethlehem Steel was originally constructed to build the nation’s rail systems. And those workers helped build the skyscrapers in New York City, and they helped win WWII.   After the Beth Plant was closed, a new Las Vegas Casino was to be built on the former steel site.  Well, the casino couldn’t find the structural steel, at first, to build the casino.  Kind of ironic, but also tragic 

If we can’t find enough steel to build casinos today, how in the world will we build the green jobs industries of the future?   We need steel to build the Obama administration’s proposed new high-speed rail system, right?   And how will the Allentowns and Homesteads and Youngstowns and Flints of this country, and all of our other rust-towns ever fully recover?  We can’t depend on casino jobs, eds and meds, tourist and service jobs alone to replace the lost manufacturing jobs.   We need a robust domestic manufacturing economy if we are going to benefit from the green jobs boom.

As Lynn Williams once said, “The pension savings of American workers should not only guarantee good pensions.  They should guarantee American workers jobs to retire from.”  Beyond that, pension trusts were collectively bargained benefits that are long-term promises to workers so that they can retire with comfort and dignity.  People gave up wage increases and other current benefits to pay for that promise.  Before pensions, and before FDR created Social Security, older workers might be found scrounging through trash bins in the alley or living in poor houses.  Along with Social Security, pension funds are part of a three-legged stool, as it’s called, so that workers can retire without the constant fear of deprivation.   Do we want to go back to the days of the poor house? 

Gerard:  You documented here, and in your earlier work, Working Capital: The Power of Labor’s Pensions, that workers’ pension money could cruelly be used to injure them. Isn’t that investment practice perverse?

Croft:  It’s not only perverse, it should be illegal.  First, as our colleagues put it, there is a gigantic pension industrial complex that is centered on Wall Street that takes hundreds of billions of dollars in fees out of pension funds just to manage our pension funds.  Then, time after time, our money have been sucked and suckered into risky financial schemes that are unsustainable, and eventually crash, destroying the hard-earned savings of tens of millions of workers and their families.  As you have pointed out, before this crash, the country suffered through the savings and loans debacle and the dot-com bust, and similar made-on-Wall-Street catastrophes.  When we come to learn that the CEOs and other financial geniuses who devised these crash schemes all made off with billions in CEO compensation and bonuses, then it’s apparent that we are putting the wrong kind of people in jail.

I’d like to return to the concept of financialization.  A large driver of financialization is the shadow bank system.  The shadow banks include the large banks and investment houses that utilize un-regulated trading and derivative schemes to make immense profits.  They also include the largely unregulated investment funds that invest in the private economy, such as real estate funds, the mega-private equity funds and hedge funds.  These systems became so inter-related that the collapse of one sector then brought down many others.  For instance, when Lehman Brothers went under, the credit default insurance plans that theoretically insured the hedge funds vanished, and the hedge fund market tanked.  After AIG was nationalized, its business continued cratering due to its business selling these default swaps to Lehman and others.  And the pension funds that had invested in these massive hedge funds and the AIGs, etc., then lost tons 

Our pension funds were siphoned into these shadow bank markets.  When pensions invest in alternative investments—not stocks and bonds—there is a term for the ancillary benefits that might result from the investment.  For instance, if a pension fund invests in affordable or workforce housing, the main reason is to achieve a good return on the investment.  But the housing that is also built might be called a collateral benefit.  In Working Capital, Dean Baker and a co-author discovered how hundreds of billions of our trust funds were invested in schemes that caused “collateral damages” for pension beneficiaries, other workers and our society.  For example, our pensions were invested in off-shore sweat-shop corporations—many American owned — that not only exploited third-world workers but also then shipped cheap products back into the country, causing jobs to be ultimately lost here.  And the lure of investing in the dot-coms that never had realistic business plans contributed to the last crash.  

There’s lots of examples, but collateral damage investing continued after the crash.  We all know about the sub-prime mortgage and the housing bubble disasters.  Well, CalPERS, the California public employees pension fund, along with many other state pensions, lost $1 trillion in one case alone by investing in securities backed by sub-prime mortgages. 

A lot of my research went into hedge funds and mega-buyout funds.  Hedge funds were originally designed as an investment program for wealthy investors.   Then hedge assets boomed over the last decade, growing ten-fold from 1998 to 2008 (to over $2 trillion).  From 2002 to 2007, the share of dollars in hedge assets coughed up by institutional investors—including pensions, university endowments, foundations, and insurance funds, etc.–jumped from 2% to 50%.   That’s a lot of money for what became, in essence, a Wall Street game to short markets and firms.  

And the money pouring into private equity, climbing by 2006-2007 to $301 billion, came disproportionately from institutional investors.  In the case of the mega-private equity funds—which in reality looked like the large LBO funds in the 1980s—there’s ample evidence that many of the funds over-leveraged their portfolio firms, leading to firm failures and bankruptcies.  Or worse, they stripped and flipped their acquisitions.  That includes Simmons Bedding, a Steelworker-represented company that just filed for bankruptcy and closed plants.  That includes Mervyn’s, Linens ‘n Things, and many others.  The money that the Boston mega-fund used to destroy Simmons came from pension funds.   Why?

In addition, they have been privatizing many our longest-standing companies—firms that often had good labor relations.  These new Wall Street barons—like KKR, Blackstone Partners and Apollo Partners–now own many of the largest employers in America and Europe; in essence, they have achieved a new stage in corporate ownership.  What does that mean for those workers, communities and our economies?  We should be investing our money to build up companies, not tear them down.

They’ve also damaged many of our civic institutions.  I don’t have to look far to see the damage.  Here in Pittsburgh, CMU and the University of Pittsburgh recently filed fraud lawsuits against Westwood Capital —ostensibly a hedge fund– after their $114 million investment vanished.  And the Pennsylvania public pension fund lost an additional $2.5 billion (than they would have otherwise, according to some estimates) by betting on an extremely large hedge fund gamble (almost 1/3 of total portfolio).  Colleges, states and municipal pension funds are cash-strapped.  That’s no reason to bet the farm. 

Worse, Congress and the White House have not passed meaningful financial reforms that might have prevented or moderated the 2008 crash and the ones before it.  The author Tom Wolfe dubbed these new corporate owners the “New Masters of the Universe.”  I call them the Shadow Bank Robbers.   Not only should government and institutional investors force transparency, reasonable fees and prohibitions against practices that harm workers, companies and communities, we should re-regulate, bring back the New Deal protections that were discarded.  And it wouldn’t hurt if we put the shadow bank robbers behind bars.  Bernie Madoff got caught running what he called a hedge fund; thousands of uber-financiers are making off with billions running an even larger ponzi scheme that is perfectly legal.  It’s crack finance, and it should be illegal.

Gerard: What struck me in your book is these two sentences:

“This book tells the story of a group of responsible enterprise and real estate investors who are profitably investing pension and similar assets in good jobs, affordable housing, and a green future. This book shows how workers’ capital, endowments, and other institutional investors, through responsible investment principles, can do well and do good at the same time.”  

My emphasis added because I think most people would not believe you could do both. They would think that if you made socially-correct investments, you would lose money. What did your research show?

Croft:   When I started writing the book, I traveled to towns and cities all over North America.  I came to know some remarkable and innovative stewards of our capital…worker-friendly investors who have built projects and invested in ventures and companies in ways that make you proud.   These investors were managing about $35 billion.  And, in fund after fund, investment after investment, these responsible fund managers have been—for the most part–financially successful. 

None of the real estate funds that I surveyed in this field guide were investing in sub-prime scams.  And none of the private enterprise investors were investing, as far as I know, in the LBO over-leveraging strategies that failed so dramatically.  So, the book shows you can do well and do good.   How?  They’re making honest profits (for our pension funds) but also treating workers with respect, investing in affordable and multi-family housing, advanced manufacturing and green jobs. 

In Pittsburgh, for example, pensions invested some $3/4 billion in worker-friendly real estate funds that successfully built multi-family housing, revitalized brownfields and re-built new commercial workplaces all over the region.  And worker-friendly enterprise funds have, in fact, saved steelworker jobs of two manufacturing firms that were bankrupt.  So, thousands of jobs were created or saved just in this area.  And these investments were the tip of the iceberg, as I’m sure many of the large redevelopment investors in the region were capitalized by institutional investors.

So, my book shows that worker-friendly investment funds have indeed had singular and significant impacts on the regions, economic sectors, companies and projects in which they invest.  Most of the funds met or bested their respective investment benchmarks.  The portfolio investments showcased in the field guide yielded not just good returns-on-investment, but also collateral benefits for working people and the environment. 

Gerard:  So that is terrific news for workers. You’ve given me the big numbers. In the book, though, you provide specific examples where these investments worked out both for the investors and workers. Would you give one here?

Croft:   There are so many important examples.  The AFL-CIO Investment Trusts worked on efforts to rebuild New Orleans, including a factory making sustainable manufactured housing.  The MEPT Fund rebuilt a burned down hospital on the north tip of Roosevelt Island, New York, and converted it into an award-winning green housing community with 500 units, plus a daycare center and essential amenities.  The KPS Capital Partners Fund restructured a bankrupt transportation company with factories in towns like St. Cloud and Crookston, Minnesota, and Winnipeg, Manitoba, now employing 1,800 union workers making hybrid busses. 

And, let’s take a really big case that helped Steelworkers.  On May 14, 1999, in the largest union-led buyout in the country since 1994, KPS Special Situations Fund partnered with other investors and a minority ESOP formed by employees to buy a pulp and paper mill, an extruding plant, and five converting plants from Champion International (for $200 million), which was distressed.  The new company, Blue Ridge Paper Products, was launched with 2,200 new employee owners.  Blue Ridge is a leading integrated manufacturer of liquid packaging, envelope paper and coated bleachboard used in food service packaging. The Company also produces specialty uncoated and extrusion coated papers. 

The Company had eight manufacturing facilities located in seven states, including the paper mill in Canton, North Carolina, the extruding mill in Waynesville, North Carolina, and in five Dairy Pak converting plants in Georgia, Iowa, Texas, New Jersey & Olmsted Falls, Ohio. Blue Ridge subsequently acquired another Dairy Pak plant in Richmond, Virginia from MeadWestvaco.

And, this company became greener.  The Canton mill became a charter member of the EPA National Achievement Track Program in 1999.  Due to a $400 million investment in new technology over a decade, the facility is one of the most efficient and environmentally-friendly pulp mills in the world.

In July 2007, Blue Ridge was sold to Packaging Holdings Corp.  KPS returned approximately 2.5 times its invested capital to its investors—including pension funds– and employee-stockholders had approximately $30 million of cash deposited into their ESOP accounts.  What a huge success!

Gerard:  Let me press you a little bit, though, because everyone will be asking this question when pension funds have suffered so badly during this downturn in the economy.  Would responsible investing have made a differenc 

Croft:  In my travels, I watched as great states and communities buckled from the weight of the Great Recession: Downstate New York.  The auto towns of the Great Lakes states.  The strapped communities of California.  From years of working in Pennsylvania, I’ve come to understand what happens when investment markets red-line communities.   Boom towns go bust, and rust towns take their place.  When the economy falls as rapidly as it did, most sectors of the economy get dragged down.

This was the largest market crash and recession since the 1930s.  So, many of the investments by even good investors were bound to be weighed down.  But my point has been that irresponsible investment practices—using our money—were a large factor in the crash, as they have been over and over.  

Some of the worker-friendly investors will inevitably suffer because the firms they’ve invested in are now having a hard time.  Some of the real estate funds have suffered redemptions from pension funds having to re-balance their assets (since pension funds lost so much in the general markets).  But as I said, the responsible funds did more due diligence, so their investments were not as risky.  If they’ve had trouble, they’ll likely recover quickly. And some funds have actually done pretty well since the downturn started.

So, we also know that it’s time that our assets are put to work for the long-term, and not in ways to destroy our economy.  With the Obama Administration’s help and guarantees, for instance, we could co-invest real money to re-build our cities and towns, and re-grow and re-shape this economy.   And our money should be invested so that markets serve society—community, in other words– and not the other way around.   We indeed have the capacity to construct infrastructure, reinvigorate our cities, and create those highly-anticipated green jobs for our children.   We just have to re-claim control of our money.

Gerard:  Well, let’s talk for a minute about California Public Employees Retirement System, then, the nation’s largest pension fund. CalPERS did engage in some responsible investing, as noted in your book. But it has suffered terribly and is expected to fire some of its real estate investment managers. Is that simply a result of the market and could not have been avoided?  Or should they really, in your estimation, have been doing something else.

Croft:   For all the things that CalPERS did right in terms of double-bottom line investing, as it’s called—investing in green housing and buildings, urban investments, and clean technology– it may have been overly aggressive in alternative investments.  And CalPERS was caught up in the sub-prime and real estate bubble markets.  CalPERS is, in fact, suing Moody’s and other ratings agencies because the pension fund claims that it did not know that a $1 trillion investment in securities (that I mentioned earlier) were in fact backed by sub-prime mortgages.  And some of their high profile investments in large real estate projects and overly-risky private equity have been slammed.  But CalPERS has recovered to the $200 billion level, and, given the fiscal crisis in California, we’re all hopeful that recovery will continue.  Some of my labor friends are now concerned that CalPERS is going back into the “dark pool,” doubling down in hedge funds and the mega-LBO funds to make up for the losses.

Gerard: What kind of response have you gotten to the book and what do you hope will happen as a result. 

Croft:   It’s really been great.  We’ve started to get a lot of coverage, and the book is making the rounds.  I’d like to see Heartland be able to create an ongoing “Center for Responsible Capital” so that we can continue to push responsible investments and act as a watchdog for union members and communities against investment abuses.

Your earlier support and that of the union has allowed me to write this book.   And, your leadership in capital strategies, rebuilding manufacturing, and kicking off the green economy has provided a lot of inspiration for the book, and we actually quoted you a couple of times—simply because it could not have been stated better.   We’ve now come to understand that responsible investors have been, profitably, creating hundreds of thousands of good jobs, building hundreds of thousands of living spaces, and helping to rebuild cities and communities.  So, as you said, our capital stewards can indeed invest in a responsible future—our future, and that of our children—and invest in a vision of the economy that’s more humane and sustainable.

***

Thomas Croft is an international expert on innovative capital strategies and jobs-oriented economic revitalization policies. He serves as executive director of the Steel Valley Authority, a regional economic development organization for Pittsburgh and 11 municipalities in the Mon Valley. The authority uses creative techniques to preserve and revitalize companies in crisis. Croft also is director of the Heartland Network, a working group of responsible pension investment advocates in the U.S. and Canada. Croft was commissioned by the Heinz Endowments to write Up From Wall Street.

Peter Navarro and Leo Gerard

Leo W. Gerard: Your chapter in the new book, “Benchmarking the Advantages Foreign Nationals Provide their Manufacturers,” describes in devastating detail how China in particular, but also other major U.S. trading partners, violate international rules. The abuses you document make clear that it’s impossible for American manufactures to compete internationally. U.S. corporations responded by off-shoring manufacturing and millions of American jobs. Why does the U.S. put up with this unfair trade?

Peter Navarro: The Bush administration put up with unfair trade because it was distracted by the war on terrorism and because of its blind ideological commitment to free trade, regardless of the unfair trading practices adopted by our trading partners. The Obama administration is putting up with unfair trade with China because it is under the mistaken notion that it’s more important for China to keep financing our budget and trade deficits than for this country to crack down on unfair Chinese trade practices so that we can restore our manufacturing base. Consumers — oblivious to the destruction that the Chinese have done to our job base — have put up with this unfair trade because in the short run they get cheap Chinese goods. The National Association of Manufacturers puts up with this unfair trade because many of its members have offshored their production to China and now find it in their interests to oppose trade reform. What is critical in the politics of this whole situation is that the American people clearly understand how unfair trade practices translate into fewer jobs and lower wages and a bleak future. Only when the American people see the chessboard more clearly will our politicians act appropriately.

Gerard: The result of decades of losses is, as you put, the “hollowing out” of the U.S. economy. It depressed wages, lowered the standard of living, created recession conditions in the Midwest – even before the current great recession. Typically, in the mainstream media, the loss of industry routinely is blamed on unions seeking what we believe is decent wages and benefits. Your chapter provides a shockingly different story. Why don’t we hear that?

Navarro: Labor unions have become a common “whipping boy” for the recessionary ills that have afflicted the US economy off and on for several decades now. One problem is that much of the financial press has a strong, antiunion bias. A second problem is the far too parochial nature of American politics. Far too many Americans — and I include many members of the American press corps here as well — simply don’t understand some of the complexities of the global economic environment that have helped trigger the US recession. The case of Chinese currency manipulation is a perfect example. Very few politicians or pundits — much less the American people — understand how China pegs the yuan to the dollar and how an undervalued yuan acts as a subsidy to Chinese exports to the United States and a tax on US exports to China. Nor do these politicians and pundits understand how this currency manipulation affects the stock market or interest rates or the rate of off shoring. Because the effects of globalization are complex, labor unions make an easy target.

Gerard:  For those unfamiliar, because it isn’t covered much, would you explain how China can be both a mercantilist and a protectionist state, and the effect of that economic behavior on the U.S.?

Navarro:  In thinking about the issue of trade reform, it is important to distinguish between mercantilism and protectionism. A mercantilist state uses tools like illegal export subsidies and currency manipulation to increase its level of exports to other nations at the expense of jobs and income in those nations. In contrast, a protectionist state uses unfair trade practices like quotas, forced technology transfer, and regulatory barriers to prevent foreign competitors from entering its markets. As a practical matter, any state that engages in protectionism likely also is a mercantilist as well. In the world arena today, China is the reigning Emperor of both mercantilist and protectionist practices. The scope of what this “beggar thy neighbor” country does in direct violation of the World Trade Organization rules is breathtaking, and it is precisely these mercantilist and protectionist practices that I outline in my chapter in the book.

Gerard:  Can we talk for a minute about currency manipulation because this is something you hear a lot, but, again, it’s rarely explained. You provide great descriptions in the chapter of why China’s undervaluing the yuan “makes exports cheap and imports dear,” as you put it. Can you give us a primer here?

Navarro:  As a practical matter, any given country can choose between a fixed or a floating exchange rate system for its currency. In a floating exchange rate system, the value of the country’s currency is determined by supply and demand conditions in the international market. Currencies that float and trade freely everyday include the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Swiss franc.

In fact, floating exchange rates represent a crucial element of any free trade regime that benefits all nations. The reason is that floating exchange rates act as a natural market mechanism to prevent any trade imbalances between countries. If one country like the United States runs a trade deficit with another country like China, the value of its currency should fall relative to the other currency. A falling currency will boost that country’s exports because its exports will be cheaper to sell while it will reduce its imports, because imports will become more expensive. In this way, the trade will come back into balance in a floating exchange rate system.

The problem is that some countries like China embrace the alternative of a fixed exchange rate system. In China’s case, it tightly pegs the value of the yuan to the US dollar. This means that no matter how big the US-Chinese trade imbalance, the dollar can’t fall relative to the yuan and bring trade back into balance. 

China pegs the yuan to the dollar in a very complex process, but in a simplified example you can think of it this way. American consumers go into Wal-Mart and buy a bunch of cheap Chinese goods with American dollars, and these dollars are exported over to China. Ordinarily, the surplus dollars would put downward pressure on the value of the dollar relative to the yuan. However, to reduce these pressures the Chinese government sweeps up these dollars in a “sterilization” process which involves selling bonds to Chinese citizens at interest rates of a little more than 4%. China then turns around and uses these sterilized dollars to buy US government bonds at interest rates of less than 2% — thereby losing a considerable amount of money on the deal. The Chinese government is willing to incur these losses, however, because by buying US government bonds, it bids the value of the dollar back up so that China can maintain its dollar-yuan peg. At the same time, China’s purchase of US government securities also helps lower US interest and mortgage rates — a kind of financial heroin that makes America feel good even as China steals its jobs and destroys its manufacturing base using this currency manipulation as a weapon.

Gerard:  I think that after the Olympics were held in China, a lot of people became aware of the high level of pollution there. So while American companies must pay decent wages and control pollution, Chinese companies don’t. But you detail much more insidious internationally illegal competitive advantages China has over the U.S. One of those is forced technology transfer. Can you describe that?

Navarro:  While currency manipulation and China’s high levels of illegal export subsidies rank as two of its most important mercantilist practices, China’s forced technology transfer represents one of its most insidious protectionist practices. The idea of forced technology transfer is that if a company like General Motors and General Electric or Intel wants to set up production facilities in China and sail into the Chinese market, it must surrender some of its technology to the Chinese in order to do this. This practice is, of course, one of the most blatant violations of the World Trade Organization. However, American corporate executives rarely challenge this practice because they are all too eager to play in the Chinese market. Over time, however, the practice of forced technology transfer in China is a one-way ticket to the destruction of the American technology base. If in the short run, American corporations surrender their technologies to China, eventually, over the longer run, China won’t need these American corporations, and they will be quite ironically run out of China by their own evolved technologies.

Gerard:  You describe virtually all of these practices as being illegal under international treaties or World Trade Organization rules. People who are so hot for free trade must know that China is violating these rules. Is it correct to say that the U.S. simply is not demanding enforcement of the regulations to its own detriment?

Navarro: That is absolutely correct — the US government has failed abysmally at using the tools at its disposal to crack down on Chinese mercantilism and protectionism. The Bush administration failed to do so because of its preoccupation with the war on terror and its misguided ideology. The Obama administration is even more culpable because it fully understands the damage that China is doing to the American economy. However, the President, the Treasury Secretary, and the United States Secretary of State have all decided that it’s more important that China continue to finance our budget and trade deficits than it is to challenge China on trade reform. The problem with this strategy is that it guarantees the long run secular decline of the American economy, which will come as an inevitable result of a further erosion of America’s already weakened manufacturing base.

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Peter Navarro is a best-selling author and CNBC contributor. His most recent book is “Always a Winner: Finding Your Competitive Advantage in and Up and Down Economy.” Mr. Navarro is also the author of the worldwide bestseller, “The Coming China Wars,” and the bestselling investment book, “If It Rains in Brazil, Buy Starbucks.” He also wrote the management book, “The Well-Timed Strategy.” With a Ph.D in economics from Harvard, Mr. Navarro is a business professor at the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. He is an expert in macroeconomic analysis of the business environment and financial markets. He has been featured on “60 Minutes,” and his articles have appeared in publications such as “Business Week,” “The New York Times,” and “The Wall Street Journal.”

Leo W. Gerard: The likes of Alabama Sen. Richard C. Shelby and other “Toyota Republicans,” as I call them, contend that GM and its partners in the Big Three American auto makers are antiquated and irrelevant and should be euthanized. You’ve written a book, “Why GM  Matters” that refutes Shelby’s premise by establishing that GM has remade itself as a company and is crucial to the American economy. I believe you. Why do so few others?

William J. Holstein: One major problem is that so many attitudes were formed five, 10, 20 years ago-long before GM began its transformation in earnest. These people, out of ignorance of the facts, are recycling old myths like these: GM can’t design cars that Americans want to drive. GM can’t innovate. GM hasn’t been willing to reduce its cost structure to compete internationally. And so on.
Then there are other people who are consciously trying to destroy or further cripple GM by recycling those arguments. One is U.S. Sen. Richard Shelby, who has four transplant factories in his home state of Alabama. It turns out that the Southern Republicans are working on behalf of their home states, and their home states have given hundreds of millions of dollars in incentives to Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Hyundai, BMW, Mercedes and others.
There is another lobby, which I call the “Bankruptcy Lobby,” that is trying to push GM into Chapter 11 because these bankruptcy lawyers and their law school allies would profit handsomely from it.

Gerard: So, to quote the book, here’s what you actually say:
“Free marketers had felt obliged to go along with the $700 billion {bailout} for Wall Street because Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (the CEO of Goldman Sachs at the very moment that it had become embroiled in Wall Street’s love affair with mega-leverage) had convinced them the entire financial system would shut down if they did not.
“But when it came to the auto industry and the UAW, they wanted to slam the brakes on. Part of it also was sheer spite: Republicans were reeling after one of their most devastating electoral losses in history. The auto industry, and particularly, the United Auto Workers, had helped get the Democratic vote out and deliver the crucial swing states of Michigan and Ohio to Barack Obama.”
Are you actually saying that Republicans were willing to vote against the good of the country out of spite?

Holstein: Sad to say, but true. They are not acting in the national interest. They are playing for their home states. They have the right to do that. But everyone should be able to understand what they’re doing, and why. I blame the media for picking up comments from Shelby and others (“GM is a dinosaur”) and printing them, without subjecting them to critical scrutiny.

Gerard: Then you go on to say that the presence of “transplant” factories, or manufacturers like Honda and Toyota from foreign countries located in states like Shelby’s Alabama made a difference for some of these senators. And you cite Shelby as an example, noting that Honda, Hyundai, Mercedes and Toyota all located plants in Alabama with the help of state funds, but then he refused to provide federal funds for an American company. So are you saying that these senators were willing to vote for something that was bad for the U.S. – the bankruptcy of the Big Three – because it might provide more business for their home states?

Holstein: As I’ve said, I think that’s exactly what they’re trying to do.

Gerard: Oddly, considering the treatment of the UAW in the press, you manage not to lay blame for GM’s situation on the union. In fact, you say that by last spring, “The Harbour Report,” which you call the bible of car-making statistics, said Toyota factories needed 30 hours to assemble a vehicle while GM required 32. So what does that mean in productivity and difference in labor cost per vehicle?

Holstein: GM and the UAW have made dramatic progress in improving the way the company’s cars are manufactured. They’ve done that by absorbing the Toyota lean production method. And by altering their own relationship, by transferring health care costs to the union’s VEBA and by implementing a two-tier wage system. It is estimated that GM will have stripped out $5,000 from the cost of each vehicle by 2010. The relationship between GM and the UAW is by no means perfect, but they have made big progress in helping the company begin to approach the cost structure that Toyota has at its Georgetown, Kentucky plant. This is truly an historic response to Toyota.

Gerard: You cite a fascinating statistic in your third chapter. You say that although the transplants like Honda and Toyota located factories in the U.S. and American manufacturers make some cars overseas and import some parts, GM’s chief economist estimates that Toyota’s U.S. content is 50 percent while GM’s is 75 percent. What does that mean in the long run to Americans, in terms of jobs and the economy, for each GM car made?

Holstein: I don’t think it’s too dramatic to say that we are in the process of defining what kind of economy we want to have as Americans. Do we want to have an economy where we have many higher-paying jobs in finance, design, engineering, management, marketing (and in GM’s case, those jobs all depend on the folks working on the line) or do we want to send our kids to work in foreign-owned factories where a majority of the higher-value added functions are performed in Japan or Korea or Germany? You have heard it said, no doubt, that it doesn’t make a difference whether it’s a GM job in Michigan or Ohio or a Hyundai job in Alabama. The impact is the same for the American economy, so they say. But that statement is based on a very superficial understanding of auto manufacturing. In fact, it’s plain stupid.

Gerard: What I found striking about your book is that it took a hard look at Toyota as well. Here is a company that the Republicans glorified all through those hearings. Some said let the Big Three fail and Toyota can pick up the slack. And yet, Toyota’s sales fell off dramatically last year, and it posted a loss too. Wasn’t it simply affected by the same market forces that GM was? And if so, why does it retain an aura of perfection?

Holstein: Yes, Toyota has almost had a Teflon coating. The media and political leaders who are so critical of GM seem to turn a blind eye to what Toyota is doing. They glorified its Prius hybrids, which were undeniably a good thing, but ignored the fact that Toyota’s much more important push was into full-sized pickup trucks, which hasn’t worked. Toyota’s design also has fallen behind GM’s. Their cars aren’t as sexy or as fun to drive. They’re like appliances on wheels. Toyota’s reputation for quality is even suffering, as they launch recalls in the United States and Japan. Consumer’s Reports no longer issues an automatic recommendation for every Toyota car. So yes, things are changing at Toyota. I think we’re seeing them go through a period of consolidation or doubt. No company can avoid making mistakes forever.

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William J. Holstein is an author, writer and magazine editor. Before “Why GM Matters: Inside the Race to Transform an American Icon,” (Walker and Co.), he wrote two other books, “Manage the Media” and “The Japanese Power Game.” He has written for “United Press International,” “Business Week,” “The New York Times” and “Fortune” magazine and served as an editor for a decade for “Business Week,” managing the magazine’s Asian coverage.  He covered the American economy and the auto industry for “U.S. News.”

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In a related matter, U.S. Rep. Tim Ryan, D-Niles, spoke with passion in Congress on March 10 about how crucial it is to sustain the U.S. auto industry. Watch him here:
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Leo W. Gerard: Economist James K. Galbraith, the Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations at the University of Texas, recently told Deborah Solomon of the New York Times that you are “the person with the most serious claim” for predicting the onslaught of the current credit disaster.

The promo for your most recent book, Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press, 2009), says the fall of the bubble economy was “completely predictable.” But you were standing nearly alone out there for some time yelling, “The collapse is coming, the collapse is coming.”

When did you get the first inkling that the collapse was impending and what did that feel like?

Dean Baker: I learned from the stock bubble in the 90s that the timing was hard to predict but  I first became convinced that it was starting to burst in the fall of 2006, (house prices had begun to fall) and I wrote a forecast projecting a recession for 2007. It turned out that I was still somewhat premature. I was expecting the price decline to gain speed more quickly and to have a more immediate impact on the economy. However, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the official arbiter of recessions, the current recession did begin in 2007, so I was not too far off.

As a more general matter, I did feel somewhat vindicated, although it was striking to me, that even as the bubble was very much in the process of deflating in late 2007 or even early 2008, most economists were still convinced that it would have little consequence for the economy. I recall repeated pronouncements from former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke that the problems were contained in the subprime market.

Gerard: What were the clues you saw that others ignored or missed?

Baker: For most economists, the idea that a market would take leave from its senses – that it would be driven by speculation – is almost inconceivable. Given that we had just seen a massive bubble in the stock market, it really should not have surprised people to see one also develop in the housing market.

The main factor that attracted my attention was the sudden spurt in house prices beginning in the mid-90s. For the hundred years from the 1890s to the 1990s, house prices nationwide had just tracked the overall rate of inflation. Yet, from 1995 to 2002 (when I first noticed the bubble), house prices rose by 30 percent in excess of the rate of inflation.

There was no explanation for this sudden jump in prices based on the fundamentals of supply and demand. Income growth had been healthy in the late 90s, but not extraordinary by the standard of the early post-war years. Furthermore, income growth had largely stopped during the 2001 recession.

Population growth was slowing, which should have slowed housing demand. On the supply side, we were building houses at near record rates, so clearly there was no serious supply constraint.

If there is a big run-up in house prices and no obvious force driving it on either the demand or the supply side, then it sure looks like a bubble. Just as additional confirmation, I checked rents, which tend to more or less follow sale prices. Rents had increased only slightly more than the rate of inflation in the late 90s, and by this decade, they were falling behind inflation. There certainly was no evidence of growing demand pressure on the housing market there. 

Finally, I noticed the rise in vacancy rates. This is consistent with people buying homes for speculative purposes. Many investors were willing to gamble on a high price for a new home or condo, betting that it would go up even more in the future. Of course, this is not sustainable. Not many people can afford to keep a unit vacant for a long time, since it means that they are paying the mortgage and getting little or nothing back. The high vacancy rates of this era virtually guaranteed that the bubble would burst.

Gerard: Did you also see problems with subprime mortgages contributing to the bubble?

Baker: The problems in the mortgage market were hardly a secret. The subprime share of the market nearly tripled from 2002 to 2006. The Alt-A share, which are typically mortgages taken out by small business owners with variable income (and often in accurate tax returns), exploded from around 1 percent to 15 percent. This should have set off flashing red lights to any serious economist.

And, the stories about liar loans and phony documents were everywhere. I was getting e-mail from people around the country telling me about friends and relatives employed by mortgage banks who were told to put in fake numbers so that the banks could issue loans. Certainly the regulatory agencies must have known this was going on.

Gerard: But if you noticed those clues, and looking back on it, those clues are actually quite obvious, why did the vast majority of financial analysts and economists and managers for large investment funds including pensions and endowments, fail to see the bubble and its implications?

Baker: The bulk of financial analysts and economists largely repeat the conventional wisdom without ever seriously trying to assess whether it makes sense. They unthinkingly follow the conventional wisdom because of the structure of incentives in their profession. No one is going to get fired because they didn’t see the housing bubble. In fact, few people are likely to even miss a promotion because they didn’t see the bubble.

Economists and financial analysts are not like steelworkers or people in other occupations. They don’t get evaluated based on their performance. They can mess up every day of the week through their whole careers, and this would be just fine, as long as they messed up in the same way as their peers.

On the other hand, the few economists/analysts who spoke up to warn about the bubble were taking huge risks. Of course, we were all ridiculed at the time. If you were an economist working at a major investment bank and tried to tell them that all their big money-making deals were going to get them in trouble, they would probably tell you to shut up and fire you if you didn’t.

If the housing market stayed strong and house prices kept rising or just remained stable, then any economist who had warned of the bubble would be laughed off as a chicken little.

In short, the incentives are such that the overwhelming majority of economists will never challenge conventional wisdom even if they think it is wrong. They are there to hold on to their jobs, not to inform the public about the economy.  

Gerard: Did you know the collapse would be this bad? How bad will it get?

Baker: I knew that it could be very bad. I was trying to be contained in my pessimism (I couldn’t completely ignore the conventional wisdom either), but I did warn that the downturn could develop into a Japan-style financial crisis. This obviously is the case that we are looking at.  Of course, if the Fed and Treasury had moved more quickly, they could have prevented some of the damage that the financial system is now seeing.

The same applies to fiscal stimulus. It was painful sitting through the months of the election campaign and then the transition when the government was completely paralyzed. At that point, economists from across the political spectrum all recognized that the economy needed further stimulus, but the politics were such that nothing could move.

As it is, the stimulus package passed by Congress is a good start, but it is nowhere near big enough to turn the economy around. The unemployment rate is virtually certain to shoot past 8.0 percent in the February jobs report and is likely to hit 9.0 percent by summer. If we are lucky, the stimulus will provide enough of a boost to keep the unemployment rate from reaching 10 percent, although I would not take this for granted at this point.

In addition to higher unemployment, house prices will continue to fall at least until summer. The big question in my mind is whether house prices return to their pre-bubble level or they overshoot on the way down. At this point, I would bet on overshooting. This implies an even larger loss of wealth for homeowners, more foreclosures and more big losses for banks.

Gerard: Will the stimulus stop the free fall?

Baker: If we are to turn things around, we really need much more stimulus and we need it quickly. My favorite idea at this point is a tax credit to employers for giving workers paid time off. For example, if employers offer paid parental leave or sick leave, or paid vacation, or increase the days they already offer, then the tax credit would cover the lost work. This can be a quick way to get millions of people back to work.

The arithmetic on this is straightforward. Suppose that employers of 100 million people give their workers an amount of additional paid time off that is equal to 5 percent of their work time. These employers would suddenly have demand for 5 percent more workers, or 5 million workers. I can’t think of a quicker, less bureaucratic way to create jobs at this point, especially now that we have already funded most of the shovel-ready infrastructure projects.

Gerard: What must be done to prevent this from recurring?

Baker: There are two key points. First we must rein in the political and economic power of the financial sector. The financial sector must serve the real economy, not the other way around. There is a long list of reforms that are needed to ensure this outcome, but the main point is that an efficient financial sector is a small financial sector.

One way to keep it small is to tax it. If we had a very modest financial transactions tax, for example 0.25 percent on the purchase or sale of a share of stock, it would have very little impact on people who invest for the long-term. However, it would have a huge impact on people who are buying at 2:00 and selling at 3:00. This sort of tax would discourage such speculation, making the markets friendlier to long-term investors.

It would also reduce the size of the financial sector, since the industry makes much of its profit off this sort of speculation. In addition, such a tax could raise more than $100 billion a year. That’s real money even in Washington.

The other point is that a balanced economy, in which workers share in the gains of growth, is not conducive to financial bubbles. We didn’t have any major bubbles in the three decades following World War II. During this period, productivity gains were passed on in wage gains, which in turn fed consumption, which led firms to invest in expanded capacity. The basis for the bubble economy was created in the 80s when this virtuous circle broke down and workers could no longer count on seeing their wages rise in step with productivity.

In short, if we want to prevent another financial bubble and the sort of economic collapse caused by its bursting, we should support policies that allow workers to share in the gains of growth. That sort of world favors investment in the productive economy rather than financial speculation.

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Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC., has written several books. His most recent, Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press, 2009), chronicles the growth and collapse of the stock and housing bubbles and explains how policy blunders and greed led to the catastrophic market meltdowns. 

His analyses have appeared in many major publications, including the Atlantic Monthly, the Washington Post, the London Financial Times, and the New York Daily News. His blog, Beat the Press, features commentary on economic reporting. 

 He is a frequent guest on National Public Radio, Marketplace, CNN, CNBC and other news programs.